

Designing EU Decision-making Procedures

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how neutral the current EU decision-making procedures are to membership and how well they obey certain transparent general constitutional principles. The paper evaluates the performance of the procedures by strategic and classical power indices of non-cooperative and co-operative games. In both cases the analysis is of ex ante type but the main difference is that in classical power indices power is understood as players' ability to swing a coalition from losing to winning whereas strategic power is defined as player's ability to contribute into the legislative equilibrium. The main emphasis of the paper is in the assessment EU procedures' stability, efficiency and fairness. The procedures are modelled as different variants of agenda-setting and bargaining games. The paper concludes that co-decision either with shared right to initiate between the Commission and the the Parliament or a double-mailhat Presidency works the best. In the Council the current weighting should be replaced by the dual majority of square-mailrooted populations and Member States.