

An Effectivity-Function Model of Strongly Core-stable Government Forms with Umpires

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ABSTRACT

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having the admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in this setting, the ‘stability problem’ for government forms can be aptly re-formulated in terms of strong core-stability of the resulting effectivity functions over a large domain of preference profiles on the outcome/policy space. We know from some previous work of the present author (see Vannucci(2000,2002)), that both neo-parliamentary and mixed semi-presidential strongly-core stable government forms can be devised even in multiparty environments provided that a collegial majority formation rule is enacted to the effect that there is only one admissible minimal majority coalition for each legislature, i.e. the set of all powerful or ‘winning’ coalition is indeed a principal order filter. The present paper extends the foregoing results to the case of constitutional umpires. A constitutional umpire (the President under most parliamentary or neo-parliamentary contemporary constitutions) is defined in our framework as a player that is endowed with veto power concerning early demotion of the executive and of its president and/or early legislature termination. We show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neoparliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial. In particular, working on a 2-jurisdiction outcome space the following propositions are proved:

Proposition 1 Let $V(n, h)$ the set of strong weight profiles, F a collegial majority formation rule on $V(n, h)$, $E_{PAU}(F)$ a neo-parliamentary government form with umpire, and D the set of all profiles of weak orders with a maximum on the outcome space. Then $E_{PAU}(F)$ is convex—hence strongly core-stable—on D .

Proposition 2 Let $V(n, h)$ the set of strong weight profiles, F a collegial majority formation rule on $V(n, h)$, $E_{PSU}(F)$ a mixed semi-presidential government form with umpire, and D the set of all profiles of weak orders with a maximum on the outcome space. Then $E_{PSU}(F)$ is convex—hence strongly core-stable—on D .

The relevance of the foregoing findings with respect to current debates on constitutional reforms, including the issue of consistency between existence of proper ‘checks and balances’ and stability of government forms is also briefly discussed.

References

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