

# Learning to Play Boundedly Rational Rules for Normal Form Games

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## ABSTRACT

We study environments where agents can play different games according to boundedly rational rules and where rules can be learned over time via monotonic selection dynamics. Rules are defined as finite algorithms that make strategy recommendations to a given agent for every game that appears. We show how rules, that, in expected terms, are (iterately) strictly dominated by other rules, tend to disappear over time. In this context, convergence to Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as convergence to the algorithm recommending a given Nash rule to every agent.