

# STRATEGIC OPTION PRICING

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We study the problem of option pricing from a game theoretic viewpoint. More specifically, we model the price of an option as the equilibrium price of a suitable game played by a buyer and a seller. In particular, we explain the fact that expectations are not evaluated according to the "historical" measure, but according to the equivalent martingale measure, as the result of the strategic interaction of the two players, without resorting explicitly to no-arbitrage or hedging. The idea is to use results like the "no-trading theorems" related to Aumann's Theorem stating the impossibility of agreeing to disagree.