XV IMGTA, Urbino (Italy) July 9-12, 2003
Final Program
 

8A: OWEN III: Dynamics and LP (Organizer: GianfrancoGambarelli, Chair: M. Holler)

• M. J Ryan: "Non Constant Sum and R+S Player Extensions of the Linear  Programming Representation of Two Person Constant Sum Games"
• J. Garay(*),  A. Scarelli,  Z. Varga and R. Cressman: "The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for two-Strategy Bimatrix  Games"

8B: VOTING IV: Power Indices  (Organizer: Gianfranco Gambarelli, Chair: A. Rusinowska)

• M. Malawski: "Counting power indices for games with a priori unions"
• A. Rusinowska(*) and H. de Swart: "Generalization and modifications of the Hoede-MailBakker index"

8C: Nonlinear Oligopoly Games I (Organizer and Chair: Akio Matsumoto)

• L. Grauer: "Strong Nash Equilibrium in Stochastic Games"
• F. Kacher and M. Larbani(*): "A Concept of Solution for a non Cooperative Game with Fuzzy Parameters"

8D: Public Goods (Chair:  S. Currarini)

• M. Koster(*), H. Reijnierse and M. Voorneveld: "Voluntary contributions to multiple public projects"
• S. Currarini: "Stable Organizations with Externalities"

  10:00-10:50 ( Aula Magna ) Plenary Lecture (Chair: Stef Tijs)

  Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, Santiago de Compostela University
  "Two Problems in the Borderline between Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games"

9A: Auctions (Chair: N. Dimitri)

• S. Bandypadhyay: "Hahn and Noll's Revenue Neutral Auction, Markets for transferable property rights and efficiency: a critique in a game theoretic framework"
• M. Bresky: "Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Multi-unit Private Value Auction Games"
• E. Grigorieva, P. J.-J. Herings, R. Mueller and D. Vermeulen(*): "The private value single item bisection auction"
• N. Dimitri: "Last-Minute Bidding Equilibrium in second price internet auctions"

9B: Games and the Environment (Chair: J. Vyrastekova)

• A. Agliari e A. Naimzada (*): "An enviromental public good game in the OLG framework"
• A. Dinar, S. Moretti(*), F. Patrone and S. Zara: "Application of Stochastic Cooperative Games in Water Resources"
• C. S. Tapiero: "Environmental Quality Control and Environmental Games"
• J. Vyrastekova(*) and D. van Soest: "Natural resource management in socially complex societies: An experimental study"

9C: Learning  I (Chair: J. Wenzelburger)

• A. Namatame: "Social Games with Collaborative Learning"
• F. Germano(*) and E. Lehrer: "Learning to Play Boundedly Rational Rules for Normal Form Games"
• J. Wenzelburger: "Learning to Play Best Response"

9D: OWEN IV Applications (Organizer: Gianfranco Gambarelli, Chair: F. Carreras)

• V. Fragnelli(*) and  Anna Iandolino: "A Cost Allocation Problem in Urban Solid Wastes Collection and Disposal"
• R. Nieva: "Enforcers, Empty Cores and Ineffective Implementation"
• G. Gambarelli(*) and S. Pesce: "Take-over Prices and Portfolio Theory"
• F. Carreras: "Alpha-decisiveness in simple games"

10A: OWEN V: A Priori Unions  (Organizer: Gianfranco Gambarelli, Chair: F. Valenciano)

• M. A. Pulido(*) and J. Sánchez-Soriano: "On Convexity in Games with a Priori  Unions"
• M. Ball: "Extending Owen's Union Concept: Superplayers, their Agreements, and the Resultant Solution for Cooperative Games"
• A. Laruelle(*) and F. Valenciano: "On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value"

10B:  Non Cooperative Games II  (Chair: A. Possajennikov)

• A. Billot, I. Gilboa(*) D. Samet, and D. Schmeidler: "Probabilities: Frequencies Viewed in Perspective"
• B. Bassan:  "Strategic Option Pricing"
• E. Amann and A. Possajennikov(*): "Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games"

10C: Nonlinear Oligopoly Games  II (Organizer and Chair: Akio Matsumoto)

• K. Uchiyama (*), A. Namatame and Y. Aruka: "An Asymmetric Oligopoly Game and Information Guidance"
• T. Onozaki: "Cournot vs Bertrand Reconsidered"
• A. Matsumoto (*) and M. Suzuki: "Cournot Dynamics with Heterogeneous Duopolists"

10D: Learning II  (Chair: U. Berger)

• G.I. Bischi, L. Sbragia (*) and F. Szidarovszki: "Global Asymptotics in a Dynamic Learning Model of Oligopolies"
• K. Kultti and P. Miettinen(*): "Herding with costly information"
• U. Berger: "A general model of best response adaptation"

For information please send an e-mail to
XVimgta@uniurb.it.