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“AN EXTENSION OF THE ANTOCI-DEI-GALEOTTI EVOLUTIONARY MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION THROUGH FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS”

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An extension of the Antoci-Dei-Galeotti evolutionary model for environment protection through financial instruments

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Abstract.

This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci, Dei and Galeotti [1] where a dynamic model is proposed to describe an innovative method to improve environmental quality based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between firms and tourists in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we first perform a global analysis of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms, also performs a direct action for the pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable balance of financial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental remediation.

Key-words: Environmental economics, evolutionary dynamics, replicator equations, multi-stability, basins of attraction.

MSC: 34C60, 34C07

1 Introduction

In a recent paper, Antoci, Dei and Galeotti [1] (quoted as ADG henceforth) propose an evolutionary game, to model an innovative system for environment protection based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration (PA henceforth). In a tourist region (R) two financial options are supposed to be issued which work like contracts between the PA and, respectively, visitors and firms operating in R, and can be regarded as (cash-or-nothing) environmental call (EC) and environmental put (EP) options. A visitor who wishes to spend a period of time in the region R can choose between the payment of a given tax (or ticket) or purchasing an EC sold by the PA at a given price, which will be refunded in the case of a low environmental quality, a sort of satisfied-or-reimbursed contract. On the other side, the PA offers to a potentially polluting firm operating in the region R the choice between the payment of a fixed tax or subscribing an EP issued by the PA. This financial activity is a contract, which binds the firm to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology, thus bearing a supplementary cost, which can be covered with a financial aid of PA only if the environmental quality target is reached (the same used for deciding the refunding or not of visitors subscribing EC).

In a continuous-time dynamic setting, at each time potentially polluting firms have to choose between two strategies: adopting an environmental-friendly technology and subscribing the EP, or using cheaper but polluting technology and paying a fixed tax, while each visitor can choose if purchasing reimbursable EC options or just paying a ticket. Given the observed pollution level Q , if such level is above a threshold \bar{Q} (poor environment quality) then visitors are refunded by PA and firms receive no financial aid, whereas if $Q < \bar{Q}$, then firms receive a financial support to refund the cost they afforded for adopting non-polluting technology and visitors receive nothing (but they can enjoy the fine environmental quality). Of course, the PA has only a role of intermediary, without direct costs, as it just has the role of organizing the trade of environmental options and check the pollution level.

In ADG the short-run time evolution of the fractions of visitors and firms adopting the different strategies is modelled by using replicator dynamics, which states that the fraction of agents (firms or visitors) that make a given choice increases as long as its expected payoff is greater than the one associated with the opposite choice. This short-run profit-maximizing behaviour may trigger a virtuous self-sustained long-run evolution leading to a desirable Nash equilibrium, where all firms adopt non polluting technologies and, consequently the environmental quality is so good that no visitors are attracted by the purchasing environmental call options. However, as often occurs in evolutionary games, this is not the only possible long-run evolution, because other attractors may exist corresponding to "perverse" evolutions towards a "bad" equilibrium where no firms adopt environmental friendly technologies and, consequently, characterized by permanently high levels of pollution. Sometimes other situations may be obtained as well, that can be defined as intermediate (or sub-optimal) equilibria. This coexistence of several attractors is always associated with uncertainty, due to the fact that the final outcome is path dependent, with different outcomes obtained as the consequence of (even small) changes of the initial conditions of the evolutionary game, according to the structure of the basins of attraction.

We stress that some dynamic scenarios can be evidenced such that even if the basin of the "bad" equilibrium has a small extension, it may be so intermingled with the basin of the "good" one that the evolutionary stability of the latter is quite low, i.e. the desired equilibrium may be very vulnerable.

The aim of this paper is to show that if in the ADG model we introduce the possibility of a direct action of the PA for the pollution control (for example by interventions for environmental damages remediation) then the attractivity of the desired equilibrium can be enhanced, and some perverse and sub-optimal long-run evolutions can be eliminated by a proper combination of the role of PA as regulator of the market of environmental options and its direct intervention. Through a global dynamic study of attractors and their basins we show that even a moderate direct action of the PA for environmental protection can help to induce a time evolution leading to the desirable Nash equilibrium, by a process fuelled both by the mechanism of environmental options regulated by the PA and its direct intervention.

Of course, the direct environmental remediation performed by the Public Administration has a cost, but we shall prove that it can always be covered by properly tuning the ticket paid by visitors that choose to pay the fixed tax, so that a "balanced budget" of the Public Administration can always be reached.

The plan of the work is as follows. In section 2 we describe the ADG model and recall some of their results. In section 3 we numerically explore the structures of the basins that can be obtained with some particular constellations of parameters, and we show that the structure of the boundaries that separate the basins of attraction of the coexisting equilibria may be quite involved, so that in some situations it is difficult to forecast the long-run outcome of the evolutionary mechanism proposed, as already stressed in a remark given by ADG. In section 4 we propose the modified model which includes a direct action of PA for environment remediation, besides the role as regulator of environmental options market, and we study the effects, on the local and global dynamic properties of the model, of this modification. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model of Antoci-Dei-Galeotti

In this section we briefly describe the ADG model and recall some of its properties. For more details the reader is referred to [1] and references therein. Following [1], we consider a tourist region R and we assume that, at each time t , each visitor has to choose (ex ante) between strategy $V1$ (buying the EC from the PA at a price \tilde{p}) and $V2$ (paying a fixed entrance ticket at a price \bar{p}), whereas a firm has to choose between strategy $F1$ (subscribing to the EP offered by the PA and paying a cost c_{NP} for the adoption of an innovative non-polluting technology) and $F2$ (paying to the PA a fixed amount \bar{q} as an environmental tax associated to a lower cost c_P for using a standard polluting technology).

The number of visitors and the one of firms are assumed to be constant over time, and $x(t) \in [0, 1]$ denotes the fraction of visitors adopting choice $V1$ at time t , $y(t) \in [0, 1]$ denotes the fraction of firms choosing $F1$ at time t . Of course, the complementary fractions choose the opposite strategy, i.e. a binary game is assumed.

Following ADG, the quality of the environment in region R at each time t is characterized by a given measure of pollution level, denoted by $Q(t)$, which can be compared with a threshold level \bar{Q} used to distinguish a good from bad environment at time t , according to $Q(t) < \bar{Q}$ or $Q(t) > \bar{Q}$ respectively. Let $\theta(y)$ be the probability that $Q > \bar{Q}$, assumed to be a decreasing function of the number of firms that choose to adopt non-polluting technologies. ADG assume

$$\theta(y) = 1 - y \quad (1)$$

i.e. a linear dependence such that $\theta(1) = 0$, that is the environmental quality target is surely reached if all firms choose strategy $F1$, i.e. all adopt non-polluting technologies, whereas if no firms adopt such technologies, i.e. all choose strategy $F2$, then $\theta(0) = 1$, that is, pollution is above the threshold level and the environmental quality target is not reached for sure.

According to ADG, the expected payoffs associated to the four strategies are:

$$EV_1(x, y) = -\tilde{p}(x) + \tilde{r}(x, y) \theta(y)$$

$$EV_2(x, y) = -\bar{p}$$

where $\bar{p} > 0$ is the price of the ticket for visitors choosing option $V2$, $\tilde{p}(x) > 0$ is the price of the EC purchased by visitors choosing option $V1$, $\tilde{r}_v(x, y)$ is the reimbursement that the PA gives to the visitors that owe the EC when $Q \geq \bar{Q}$. In ADG the following linear functions are proposed

$$\tilde{p}(x) = \bar{p} + \alpha + \beta x \quad ; \quad \tilde{r}(x, y) = \gamma - \delta x - \varepsilon y$$

where $\alpha \geq 0$ and $\beta > 0$, $\gamma > 0$, $\varepsilon > 0$, $\delta \geq 0$ are parameters controlled by the PA: α is the minimum difference between the price of the EC and the fixed ticket, obtained for $x = 0$; β indicates the positive correlation between the price of EC and the number of visitors asking to buy them, i.e. EC demand; the positive coefficient ε indicates that the amount of money refunded to visitors in case of high pollution is negatively related to the number of non-polluting firms, i.e. the same number that influences the environmental quality. The sign of the coefficient δ is undetermined because two opposite effects coexist: from one side if the number of visitors asking for EC increases, then the PA collects more money to be used for reimbursement, on the other side if more visitors hold EC then more must be refunded when $Q > \bar{Q}$.

Analogously, the expected payoffs for firms are:

$$EF_1(x, y) = -c_{NP} + \tilde{r}_F(x, y) (1 - \theta(y))$$

$$EF_2(x, y) = -c_P - \bar{q}$$

where \bar{q} is the environmental tax that polluting firms must pay, $c_P > 0$ and $c_{NP} > 0$ have been defined above, and

$$\tilde{r}_F(x, y) = \lambda + \mu x + \nu y$$

where $\lambda \geq 0$, $\mu > 0$ and $\nu \geq 0$, are coefficients fixed by the PA; μ indicates a positive correlation between the number of visitors that purchase EC and the amount of financial aids given by the PA to firms adopting non-polluting technologies whenever $Q < \bar{Q}$, whereas the undetermined sign of ν depends on contrasting effects related to the number of firms to be refounded by the PA in case of $Q < \bar{Q}$ and the fact that increasing y means more probability to reach the desired environmental quality.

All in all, if these assumptions are inserted into the dynamic equations that express the "replicator dynamics" (see [3], [4], [2]):

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x} &= x (EV_1 - \overline{EV}) = x(1-x)(EV_1 - EV_2) \\ \dot{y} &= y (EF_1 - \overline{EF}) = y(1-y)(EF_1 - EF_2)\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

where the expression of average payoffs $\overline{EV} = xEV_1 + (1-x)EV_2$; $\overline{EF} = yEF_1 + (1-y)EF_2$ has been used, one gets the dynamic equations of the ADG model:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x} &= x(1-x) [\gamma - \alpha - (\beta + \delta)x - (\varepsilon + \gamma)y + \delta xy + \varepsilon y^2] \\ \dot{y} &= y(1-y) [-(c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) + \lambda y + \mu xy + \nu y^2]\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

The following further conditions on the parameters are given in ADG to avoid trivial dynamic behaviors of the model.

a) $EV_1(1, 0) - EV_2(1, 0) > 0$, that is, if $y = 0$ then purchasing the EC must be convenient for visitors even if $x = 1$; this condition becomes

$$\gamma - \alpha - \beta - \delta > 0.\tag{4}$$

b) Even if $\delta < 0$, a quote of the money obtained by the PA from EC, must return to subscribers if $Q > \bar{Q}$, i.e.

$$\beta + \delta > 0.\tag{5}$$

c) The non-polluting technologies (strategy F1) are more costly than fixed taxes and polluting technologies (strategy F2)

$$c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q} > 0.\tag{6}$$

d) If environmental quality is reached, i.e. $Q < \bar{Q}$, then the adoption of non-polluting technologies must be convenient, (thanks to the financial aid of PA) even if $x = 0$, i.e.

$$\lambda + \nu - (c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) > 0.\tag{7}$$

Under these conditions, the following result is given in ADG:

Proposition 1. *Six equilibrium points exist along the boundary of the phase space $[0, 1]^2$, given by the four vertices $0 = (0, 0)$, $G = (0, 1)$, $I = (1, 1)$, $B = (1, 0)$, as well as two further equilibria $S_0 = (0, y_4)$ and $S_1 = (1, y_3)$. G and B are stable nodes and the other ones are saddle points. Moreover, an interior equilibrium may exist, $P_0 = (x_0, y_0) \in (0, 1)^2$ that can be an unstable node, a saddle, an unstable focus or a stable focus. In the latter case an unstable close invariant curve may exist which bounds the basin of attraction of P_0 .*

3 Multistability and basins of attraction

As shown by ADG, and recalled in the previous section, multistability, that is, the coexistence of several attractors, is a feature of the ADG evolutionary model. In particular, the "good" equilibrium $G = (0, 1)$, where all firms adopt non-polluting technologies and consequently no visitors are motivated to purchase the EC options, always coexists with a "bad" equilibrium $B = (1, 0)$, where no firms adopt non-polluting technologies. This can be considered as a "poverty trap", because it can be seen as the outcome of a "perverse evolution" leading to a situation completely different from the desired one. In ADG a short remark is given stating that different structures of the boundaries of the basins of attraction can be obtained. In this section we numerically show some typical structures of the basins of attraction, both in the case of two coexisting stable equilibria, G and B , as well as in the case of a third one, the inner stable equilibrium P_0 .

Following a suggestion given in ADG, in order to investigate some bifurcation patterns leading to different structures of the basins, we multiply all the coefficients of the first dynamic equation by a parameter $\rho \in [0, 1]$, starting from the same set of parameters proposed in ADG, example 3, namely $\alpha = 0$, $\beta = 8.3$, $\gamma = 91$, $\delta = 1.4$, $\varepsilon = 164$, $\lambda = 2.5$, $\mu = 1$, $\nu = 2$, $c_{NP} = 12$, $c_P = 8$, $\bar{q} = 2$.

In fig. 1a, obtained with $\rho = 0.4$, the simplest situation is shown, where the grey region represents the basin of attraction of the "good" equilibrium $G = (0, 1)$ and the white region is the basin of the "bad" equilibrium $B = (1, 0)$. The boundary that separates the two basins is determined by the union of the stable sets of the two saddle points along the vertical boundaries, joining at the interior equilibrium P_0 , which is an unstable node for this set of parameters.

Fig. 1b, obtained after changing of the two parameters $\mu = 5$, $c_{NP} = 13$, and with $\rho = 0.7$, shows a more involved structure of the boundaries that separates the two basins. The stable sets of the two saddle points along the vertical edges now wing around the interior equilibrium, which is an unstable focus for this set of parameters. This gives a situation of higher uncertainty about the long run evolution of the system.

If ρ is further increased, the interior equilibrium undergoes a subcritical Hopf bifurcation, at which it becomes a stable focus surrounded by an unstable closed invariant curve which constitutes the boundary of the basin. This is the situation shown in fig. 2a, obtained with the same set of parameters as fig. 1b and $\rho = 0.9$, where the basin of P_0 is represented by the light grey region. In this case the stable sets of the two saddle points located on the vertical




Figure 1:

boundaries, that still form the boundary that separates the basins of G and B , wing around the unstable invariant curve from outside.

It is worth to notice that even if the PA can control the parameters so that the inner "sub-optimal" equilibrium is not stable and the basin of the "bad" equilibrium $B = (1, 0)$ shrinks, according to Proposition 1 it remains stable for each set of the parameters. Moreover, even if the extension of its basin is reduced, such basin may be quite intermingled with the one of the "good" equilibrium $G = (0, 1)$ and consequently its presence remains quite disturbing. An example is shown in fig. 2b, obtained with the set of parameters $\alpha = 160$, $\beta = 8.3$, $\gamma = 210$, $\delta = 1.4$, $\varepsilon = 50$, $\lambda = 1.5$, $\mu = 35$, $\nu = 5$, $c_{NP} = 15$, $c_P = 8$, $\bar{q} = 2$ and $\rho = 0.3$. It is quite evident that even if we have a smaller extension of the basin of the bad equilibrium, the good one is still very vulnerable because points of the white basin are quite close to it.

Fig. 3 exhibits two typical trajectories that, even starting from two initial conditions which are quite close, evolve towards the good and the bad equilibrium respectively. This kind of dynamic evolution can be observed in all the cases shown in the previous pictures, and may be quite misleading because the first portions of the two trajectories are almost identical, both characterized by an increase of the fraction of visitors choosing the strategy $V1$, i.e. purchasing the EC options. Then the two trajectories suddenly turn towards opposite reactions of firms.




Figure 2:




Figure 3:

4 The effects of a direct environmental protection by the Public Administration

As argued in the previous sections, the financial market of Environmental Put and Call options offered by the Public Administration to firms and visitors respectively, as described in the ADG model, may trigger a virtuous and self-sustained endogenous evolution leading to a final situation where all firms adopt non polluting technologies and, consequently, the environmental quality becomes so good that no visitors are attracted by the EC options. However, this is not the only possible evolution in the long run, because for any set of parameters there is space for "perverse" evolutions towards a stable "bad" equilibrium, characterized by no firms adopting environmental friendly technologies and, consequently, high levels of pollutions. Moreover, other situations may be obtained where the system evolves towards intermediate (say sub-optimal) situations, leading to high degrees of uncertainty due to the fact that the final outcome is path dependent, with different outcomes obtained as the consequence of (even small) changes of the initial conditions of the evolutionary game.

It is worth to stress that in the ADG model the Public Administration only has an indirect role of intermediary between firms and visitors, just to set up the financial market of put and call environmental options with proper prices, as well as deciding alternative fixed taxes for both. In this section we assume that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms for trading environmental financial options, also performs a direct action to control pollution, for example by (even moderate) interventions for environmental damages remediation. As we shall see, such direct action, properly combined with the regulation of financial market of environmental options described above, may enhance the attractivity of the desired equilibrium and reduce, even eliminate, perverse and sub-optimal long-run evolutions. Of course, the direct environmental remediation performed by the PA has a cost, but we shall prove that it can always be covered by properly fixing the price \bar{p} of the ticket paid by visitors, so that a "balanced budget" for the Public Administration can always be obtained.

In order to model the direct action of the Public administration let us modify the probability $\theta(y)$ as follows

$$\theta(y) = 1 - a - by$$

where $a \in [0, 1]$ represents the effect of direct action of Public Administration on the pollution level and $b \in [0, 1]$ modulates the effect on the environmental quality of the fraction of firms choosing non-polluting technologies. With this modification we have $\theta(0) = 1 - a$, i.e. if no firms adopt environmental friendly techniques the probability that $Q \geq \bar{Q}$ can decrease only thanks to the direct action of Public Administration. On the other side $\theta(1) = 1 - a - b$, hence the usual assumption $\theta(1) = 0$, i.e. if all firms adopt non-polluting techniques then the environmental quality goal is surely reached, implies that $a + b = 1$, i.e. $a = 1 - b$. So, the probability that $Q \geq \bar{Q}$ becomes

$$\theta(y) = b(1 - y) \tag{8}$$

where a small value of b means a high direct intervention of Public Administration, whereas for $b = 1$ the same expression of the ADG model, without any direct action of Public Administration, is obtained. This means that (8) is a generalization of (1).

In the following we show how this change is reflected on the dynamic properties of the evolutionary model, in particular on the stability of the steady states and the structure of the basins.

Of course, the model proposed in this section is quite similar to the one of ADG, and reported in the previous section, so in what follows we only stress the differences between the two models as the new parameter b varies. All the other parameters have the same meaning as in the previous section. With (8), the expected payoffs become:

$$EF_1(x, y) = -c_{NP} + (\lambda + \mu x + \nu y)(1 - b + by)$$

whereas EF_2 does not change. Analogously, we get

$$EV_1(x, y) = -\bar{p} - \alpha - \beta x + (\gamma - \delta x - \varepsilon y)(b - by)$$

and EV_2 remains the same. So, the complete dynamic model becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x} &= x(1-x)[- \alpha - \beta x + (\gamma - \delta x - \varepsilon y)(b - by)] := x(1-x)F(x, y) \\ \dot{y} &= y(1-y)[-(c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) + (\lambda + \mu x + \nu y)(1 - b + by)] := y(1-y)G(x, y)\end{aligned}\tag{9}$$

Some conditions on the parameters are modified, due to the presence of the parameter b . The condition (4) becomes

$$b\gamma - \alpha - \beta - b\delta > 0\tag{10}$$

which states that if $y = 0$, i.e. all firms are polluting, then the visitors purchasing the *EC* will be refunded even if $x = 1$. It should be noted that the amount of money refunded to visitors is no longer $\gamma - \alpha - \beta - \delta$, like in the ADG model, but it is smaller, because the PA uses some money to pay its direct action to repair pollution damages, a cost for PA which is higher for smaller values of b . Notice that (10) can be written as:

$$b > \frac{\alpha + \beta}{\gamma - \delta}\tag{11}$$

i.e. the price of the *EC*, given by $\alpha + \beta$, cannot be greater than its expected value, $b - by$ (which becomes equal to b when $y = 0$) times $(\gamma - \delta)$, otherwise no rational visitor will decide to buy the *EC*.

Conditions (5), (6) and (7) remain the same, and the following new condition is imposed

$$\lambda(1 - b) - (c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) < 0\tag{12}$$

which states that cost expected by a non-polluting firm (given by the cost of non-polluting technologies minus the expected financial support given by the PA if the environmental quality

target is reached) must be greater than the cost of a polluting firm when $y = 0$ and $x = 1$, i.e. all other firms are polluting and all visitors prefer to pay the ticket. This condition is imposed in order to rule out opportunistic behaviours.

As we shall see, the (undetermined) sign of the expression

$$L(b) = (\lambda + \mu)(1 - b) - (c_{NP} - c_p - \bar{q}), \quad (13)$$

will be important in the study of the stability of the "bad" equilibrium. Its meaning is the following: If all visitors decide to purchase the *EC*, then the PA gets money that can be used both for the financial support of non-polluting firms and for direct intervention to repair environmental damages. From condition (6) $L(1) < 0$. However, for decreasing values of b , i.e. if PA decides to increase its direct intervention, of course taking into account (11), $L(b)$ can change its sign and, as we shall see, this has an important role to force the "bad" equilibrium to lose its stability, so that "perverse" trajectories no longer occur. This is proved in the next section.

4.1 Existence and stability of equilibrium points

Besides the four equilibrium points located at the vertices of the phase space $[0, 1]^2$, the existence of other equilibria of the model (9) can be obtained through a study of the nullclines $F(x, y) = 0$ and $G(x, y) = 0$. Indeed, boundary equilibria are located at the intersections of $F(x, y) = 0$ with the horizontal edges $y = 0$, $y = 1$ (with $0 < x < 1$) or at the intersections between $G(x, y) = 0$ and the vertical edges $x = 0$, $x = 1$ (with $0 < y < 1$). Moreover, the intersections between the two nullclines inside $(0, 1)^2$ define interior equilibria.

The nullcline $F(x, y) = 0$ is given by the following function:

$$x = \varphi(y) = \frac{(\gamma - \varepsilon y)(b - by) - \alpha}{\beta + \delta(b - by)}. \quad (14)$$

and the nullcline $G(x, y) = 0$ can be defined as:

$$x = \psi(y) = \frac{c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}}{\mu(1 - b + by)} - \frac{\lambda + \nu y}{\mu}. \quad (15)$$

Along the horizontal edges $y = 0$ and $y = 1$ there are no equilibria, because $\varphi(1) = \frac{-\alpha}{\beta} < 0$, and $\varphi(0) = \frac{\gamma b - \alpha}{\beta + \delta b} > 1$ due to condition (10). Instead, along the vertical edges $x = 0$ and $x = 1$ two boundary equilibria may exist. In fact, from $\psi(y) = 0$ we get

$$\nu b y^2 + [\lambda b + \nu(1 - b)]y - [A - \lambda(1 - b)] = 0.$$

where $A = c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}$, hence $[A - \lambda(1 - b)] > 0$ for (12). The real and positive solution

$$y_3 = \frac{-(\lambda b + \nu(1 - b)) + \sqrt{(\lambda b + \nu(1 - b))^2 + 4\nu b(A - \lambda(1 - b))}}{2\nu b},$$

gives an equilibrium $S_0 = (0, y_3)$ provided that $y_3 \leq 1$, i.e. $A \leq \lambda + \nu$, which is always true for (7).

Analogously, $\psi(y) = 1$ gives

$$\nu b y^2 + [(\lambda + \mu)b + \nu(1 - b)]y + L(b) = 0$$

where $L(b)$ is given in (13). If $L(b) < 0$ then

$$y_4 = \frac{-((\lambda + \mu)b + \nu(1 - b)) + \sqrt{((\lambda + \mu)b + \nu(1 - b))^2 - 4\nu b L(b)}}{2\nu b}$$

is real and positive, and $y_4 = 0$ for $L(b) = 0$. Moreover, if $y_4 \leq 1$, i.e. $-L(b) \leq \nu + (\lambda + \mu)b$, then an equilibrium $S_1 = (1, y_4)$ exists along the vertical edge $x = 1$.

The following result concerns the stability of the boundary equilibria, and should be compared with Proposition 1.

Proposition 2 *For the dynamical system (9) with parameters satisfying the conditions (10), (5), (6), (7) and (12), $O = (0, 0)$ and $I = (1, 1)$ are saddle points, with stable set along the vertical edge and unstable set along the horizontal edge; $S_0 = (0, y_4)$ and $S_1 = (1, y_3)$, when they exist, are saddle points with unstable sets along the vertical edges.*

The equilibrium point $G = (0, 1)$ is a stable node.

The equilibrium point $B = (1, 0)$ is a stable node if $b_T < b < 1$, where

$$b_T = 1 - \frac{c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}}{\lambda + \mu}$$

and B is a saddle point for

$$b < b_T$$

If $b = b_T$ then $y_3 = 0$, i.e. $S_1 \equiv B$, and the two equilibria undergo a transcritical (or stability exchange) bifurcation.

Remark. The bifurcation condition $b = b_T$ corresponds to $L(b) = 0$, hence the stability loss of the "bad" equilibrium B corresponds to a change of sign of $L(b)$ from negative to positive.

Proof.

The Jacobian matrix of (9) computed at the equilibrium O becomes:

$$J(0, 0) = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma b - \alpha & 0 \\ 0 & -(c_{np} + p_p - c_p - \bar{q}) + \lambda(1 - b) \end{pmatrix}.$$

The first eigenvalue $\gamma b - \alpha > \beta + b\gamma > 0$ for (10). and the second eigenvalue $-(c_{np} + p_p - c_p - \bar{q}) + \lambda(1 - b) < 0$ for (12). Then O is a saddle point.

At the equilibrium point $I = (1, 1)$ the Jacobian matrix is:

$$J(1, 1) = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha + \beta & 0 \\ 0 & (c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) - (\lambda + \mu + \nu) \end{pmatrix}$$

It does not depend on b , and as in the ADG model it is a saddle point due to condition (7).

Also at $G = (0, 1)$ the Jacobian does not depend on b , being:

$$J(0, 1) = \begin{pmatrix} -\alpha & 0 \\ 0 & (c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) - (\lambda + \nu) \end{pmatrix}.$$

As in the ADG model, both the eigenvalues are always negative for (7), hence G is a stable node.

Finally, from

$$J(1, 0) = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha + \beta + b(\delta - \gamma) & 0 \\ 0 & (c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}) - (\lambda + \mu)(1 - b) \end{pmatrix}$$

follows that the eigenvalue $\alpha + \beta + b(\delta - \gamma) < 0$ because of condition (10), whereas the second eigenvalue, associated with eigenvector along the invariant line $y = 1$, is negative for $b > b_T$, and positive for $b < b_T$. It is easy to check that for $b = b_T$ we have $\psi(0) = 1$, i.e. $S_1 \equiv B$. This concludes the proof.

4.2 Global dynamic properties and "environmental policy implications"

The results of the previous section show that a suitable direct action of the PA for pollution control, associated with its indirect action as promoter of the environmental financial assets, can eliminate the presence of the "bad" attractor through a local bifurcation that transforms it into an unstable equilibrium. In this section we show, by some numerical simulations, that decreasing values of the parameter b may induce important changes in the global dynamic scenarios as well.

For example, fig. 4a, obtained with the set of parameters $\alpha = 0.2$, $\beta = 0.4$, $\gamma = 5.5$, $\delta = 0.3$, $\varepsilon = 0.1$, $c_{NP} = 11.3$, $c_P = 8$, $\bar{q} = 2$, $\lambda = 1$, $\mu = 0.8$, $\nu = 0.31$ and $b = 0.3$, shows a situation where the structure of the basins of attraction is such that the "good" equilibrium $G = (0, 1)$, whose basin is represented by the grey region, is very vulnerable because some portions of the white basin of the "bad" equilibrium $B = (1, 0)$ are very close to it. However, a computation of the bifurcation value $b_T = 1 - \frac{c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}}{\lambda + \mu} = 1 - \frac{0.3}{1.8} = 0.27$ suggests that a slight decrease of b , i.e. a slight increase of the direct action of the PA for pollution abatement, will eliminate this problem. This can be seen by the numerical computation of the basins shown in fig. 4b, obtained with $b = 0.27$, where the good equilibrium $G = (0, 1)$ is the unique global attractor, i.e. its basin covers the whole region $(0, 1)^2$.

The beneficial effects of decreasing values of b can also be appreciated starting from a situation with three attractors, like the one shown in fig. 2a. Such a situation can be seen as a benchmark case, for the model considered in this paper, obtained with $b = 1$, i.e. no direct intervention of the PA. If b is decreased, the basin of attraction of the interior sub-optimal equilibrium, bounded by a closed invariant repelling curve, shrinks (see fig. 5a, obtained with the same set of parameters as fig. 2b and $b = 0.7$) until it disappears after a subcritical Hopf bifurcation occurs, at which the interior equilibrium becomes an unstable focus (see fig. 5b, obtained




Figure 4:

for $b = 0.65$). It is quite evident that the dynamic situation is now characterized by a higher degree of evolutionary stability of the "good" equilibrium. Moreover, if b is further decreased until the bifurcation value $b_T = 1 - \frac{c_{NP} - c_P - \bar{q}}{\lambda + \mu} = 1 - \frac{3}{7.5} = 0.6$ is crossed, then $G = (0, 1)$ remains the unique global attractor, and a situation similar to the one shown in fig. 4b is obtained.

A final remark is necessary in order to state the economic sustainability of a direct action included in the PA environmental policy. In fact, a direct pollution abatement has a cost, so a source of income that covers the expenses for refunding non polluting firms as well as to finance the direct action for pollution abatement must be found. Indeed, a balanced budget can always be obtained by the PA by properly tuning the ticket \bar{p} that visitors are asked to pay. In fact, \bar{p} does appear at all in the dynamic equations (9), hence it does not have any influence in the dynamics of the model even if it increases the income of the PA. So, it can be used as an exogenous parameter to control the budget balance.

5 Conclusions

We have proposed a modification of the evolutionary model proposed by Antoci et al. (2009) to describe the time evolution of a system where a Public Administration tries to reconcile the presence of polluting firms and visitors in a touristic region by adopting financial instruments to induce environmental maintenance. We have introduced in the model an additional parameter that describes the possibility of a moderate direct intervention of the Public Administration in the pollution control, added to its role as intermediary in the market of environmental financial options. We have shown that by properly tuning this parameter the presence of bad asymptotic evolutions leading to a high pollution trap, always present in the originary model, can be




Figure 5:

eliminated through a transcritical bifurcation. Moreover, by a numerical analysis of the global dynamical behaviour of the modified model, we have shown some beneficial effects on the structure of the basins of attraction as well. The model analyzed in this paper can also be applied to different situations, not only for tourists but also for citizens living in an industrial town, where the Municipality may add to its usual direct action against pollution a role as intermediary for some kinds of financial options in order to set up a virtuous trade off between the way citizens pay taxes and financial supports to firms that adopt less polluting technologies. As shown in our model, a suitable trade-off between the direct action of Public Administration and the adoption of financial instruments is necessary to help the virtuous dynamic process leading to the desired environment quality goals.

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